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a b s t r a c t
The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may
also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort
coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice
to sanction. We compare the effect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the
experimenter to that of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who has
superior informationabout theprevious effort of theotherplayers.Weﬁnd that cooperative
subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal which signiﬁcantly reduces
the effect of sanctions.
1. Introduction
Authorities commonly take measures in order to promote cooperation between people, including laws, sanctions, and
monitoring devices. These interventions provide incentives for good behavior, but the very fact that they are introduced
can also change people’s perception of the organization or society they are a part of. For example, increasing punishment
for a particular crime can inform the public that this crime is prevalent and hard to control. Introducing time management
systems in a workplace may signal that shirking is the social norm. Increasing monitoring on immigrant groups may lead
people to believe that these groups have bad intentions and have a stigmatizing effect. International ﬁnancial intervention
in a country can inform investors that its mismanagement has been worse than previously thought.
In all these examples, the introduction of the intervention sends a signal that others are not cooperating, which may
dampen or even reverse the desired impact of the measure. Recently, a number of theorists have modeled such a signaling
effect, based on particular assumptions on how beliefs are formed (Sliwka, 2007; Friebel and Schnedler, 2011; Bénabou and
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tirole, 2011; Van der Weele, 2012). Our objective is to understand how people actually make inferences in this context, and
o this end we run a laboratory experiment. More speciﬁcally, we study behavior in an experimental coordination game,
esigned to answer the following questions.
Can the introduction of incentives associated with small, non-deterrent1 sanctions induce efﬁcient behavior and raise
expectations of cooperative actions by other players?
In situations of imperfect information about the past behavior of other group members, can the introduction of sanc-
tions make agents more pessimistic about the actions of others by implicitly signaling that other players have not been
cooperating? If so, does this reduce the effectiveness of sanctions?
ur experimental setup is a two person minimum-effort game: a coordination game with many Pareto ranked equilibria,
ased on the setup in Goeree and Holt (2001, 2005). Each player chooses a level of costly effort, and is rewarded according to
he minimum of the efforts of all players in the group. The more efﬁcient equilibria result only if all players play individually
isky strategies. Doubt about the other player’s willingness to play such a strategy may result in inefﬁcient outcomes.
In all experimental treatments agents were matched in groups of three, where the third player was a ‘principal’ who
eneﬁtted proportionally to the minimum-effort chosen by the other two in the group. The subjects played the minimum-
ffort game twice, but the principalwas the only one to be informedof the outcomeof the ﬁrst roundbefore the second round
as played. This information structure was common knowledge. Apart from effort choices, we also elicited the subjects’
eliefs about the effort of the other player.
ToanswerQuestion1,wecomparea control treatmentwithout sanctionswitha sanction treatment. In a control treatment
o sanctionswere introducedbetween rounds, andconsequently the second roundwas the sameas theﬁrst. In the treatment,
mild sanction Fwas introduced for both players in the group, that lowered the earnings of a subject if she selected loweffort
and also carried a small ﬁxed cost for the principal), but did not change the set of Nash equilibria. Because the sanction was
ntroduced by the experimenter unconditional on past effort choices by the subjects, we call this the ‘exogenous sanction
reatment’.
Our hypotheses for the effect of such sanctions are based on a simple formal model, explained in Section4. The experi-
ental game has many Nash equilibria, so in order to make predictions we use a model similar to level-k reasoning (Nagel,
995; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006). We assume that people think of their partner as either a pessimistic type, who
elieves the partner will choose low effort, or an optimistic type, who believes their partner will choose high effort. This
odel predicts that the change in payoffs associated with sanctions should increase effort through (a) an ‘incentive effect’,
nd (b) a ‘belief effect’, i.e. a change in expectations about the action of the other player. The ﬁrst result of the paper is that
e do indeed ﬁnd both effects in the data, and so our answer to Question 1 is afﬁrmative.
Question 2 addresses a potential signaling effect of sanctions. To answer it, we introduced an additional treatment. Before
he second round of the minimum-effort game was played, the principal could decide whether or not to introduce the same
anction F as above, at a small cost to his own earnings. Because the principal had observed ﬁrst round behavior and could
ondition the sanction on this behavior, we call this the ‘endogenous sanction treatment’.
Our model predicts that in this treatment there exists an equilibrium in which the principal will sanction if and only
f there is at least one player who plays relatively low effort. Therefore, a player who played relatively high effort in the
rst round, but nevertheless observes a sanction, will learn that his partner is a pessimistic type who is likely to continue
o choose low effort: sanctions are ‘bad news’. This means that for these players the incentive effect of the sanction will
e counteracted by a negative belief effect. By contrast, people who initially chose low effort will not get any information
rom a sanction, because in equilibrium it would have been introduced independently of their partner’s behavior. Thus,
ur hypothesis is that endogenous sanctions are less effective than exogenous sanctions, especially for those who behaved
ooperatively.
Our second result is that we can conﬁrm these hypotheses. There is no evidence that subjects with low ﬁrst-round effort
eact differently when facing an endogenous sanction. On the other hand, the signaling effect of the endogenous sanction
or those with high ﬁrst-round effort is so strong that it eliminates the incentive effect, so the net effect is indistinguishable
rom the case where there is no sanction. As a result, exogenous sanctions are on aggregate signiﬁcantly more effective than
ndogenous sanctions.
To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to investigate experimentally whether the introduction of sanctions signals uncoop-
rative behavior by other group members. The main message of our paper is that the effectiveness of sanctions depends on
he context inwhich they are introduced. On the one hand, people recognize the incentive effects that sanctionswill have on
thers, which increases their effectiveness. On the other hand, when information about the behavior of others is limited, as
s the case in modern large-scale societies or ﬁrms, the introduction of sanctions may cause pessimism by drawing attention
o past misbehaviors. This is especially true for those that are optimistic and behave cooperatively.
1 By ‘small’, ‘non-deterrent’ or ‘mild’, we mean that sanctions do not make playing the socially efﬁcient action a dominant strategy.
Finally, this paper makes two methodological contributions. First, we use novel tests that can correctly identify signiﬁ-
cant evidence that sanctions increases effort without making distributional assumptions. Second, we use a new, incentive
compatible mechanism to elicit belief intervals.
2. Literature
Our experimental study relates to several strands of the literature. First, our paper is inspired by a theoretical literature
in economics on the potential signaling that occurs when imposing a sanction, or more generally when introducing some
policy. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) showhow the choice of incentives can provide information to an agent about the difﬁculty
of a task. This paper has recently been tested experimentally by Bremzen et al. (2011). Sliwka (2007), Van der Weele (2012),
Bénabou and Tirole (2011) and Friebel and Schnedler (2011) investigate how the choice of incentive policies can signal
information of the policy maker about the relative prevalence of different types in the population to imperfectly informed
agents. In each of these papers, the signaling effect of sanctions depends on the existence of agentswith different preferences.
In equilibrium, sanctions are a signal that there are many selﬁsh types around, which reduces the motivation of the agents
to exert effort, either because of conformist preferences or because of complementaries in technology. The common ﬁnding
in this literature is that the signaling effect of sanctions leads the principal to use sanctions less often relative to situation
where the agents are perfectly informed. We complement this theoretical literature by showing that the signaling effect can
also obtain in a setting in which all agents have identical preferences, and only differ according to their beliefs.
Second, we contribute to the growing experimental literature on ‘endogenous sanctions’. A recent literature has con-
trasted the effect of sanctions for defection in a public good game that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter, with
similar sanctions that are implemented by direct voting mechanisms. These studies show that sanction schemes introduced
through voting can raise expectations that other group members will be cooperative. As a consequence, and in contrast to
our ﬁndings, endogenous sanctions are more effective than exogenous sanctions (Tyran and Feld, 2006; Markussen et al.,
2011; Kamei, 2010).
Our paper is also related to ﬁeld experiments on the crowding out effect of sanctions (see Frey and Jegen, 2001; Bowles,
2008 for a survey). For example, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) show empirically that a monetary incentive lowers accep-
tance rates of nuclear repository waste. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show that a ﬁne for picking up children late from
a day-care center actually increased late-coming. Although the signaling mechanism we describe may be at work, these
papers cannot differentiate it from potential alternative explanations, such as a direct impact of incentives on preferences,
or the idea that a ﬁne is a signal about some relevant characteristic of the principal. By contrast, our explicit distinction
between exogenous and endogenous sanctions and the use of a between-subject design allows us to identify that sanctions
carry signals about the past behavior of other agents.
Thirdly, we contribute to the experimental literature on the effect of incentives in coordination games (see Devetag and
Ortmann, 2007 for a survey of experimental results in coordination games). Goeree and Holt (2001, 2005) ﬁnd in a between-
subject design that effort levels in a minimum-effort game are higher when effort costs are lower. By contrast, our Question
1 refers to the effect of the introduction of sanctions, hence refers to a within subject design. Brandts and Cooper (2006) look
at the effect of exogenous bonuses that are proportional to the minimum group effort, whereas the size of the sanction we
consider is based on individual choices and therefore depends on the individual’s behavior only.
Finally, Xiao (2013) also studies a signaling effect of sanctions by superiorly informed third parties. In a sender-receiver
game, an outside ‘enforcer’ can punish a senderwho sends falsemessages to the receiver. Because the payoffs of the enforcer
do not depend on whether the sender deceives, it is perhaps not so surprising that sanctions become a signal of the sender’s
deception. By contrast, in our study, the interests of the players and the enforcer are aligned. Thus sanctions have a dual role
of both signaling information and enhancing coordination. It is the tension between these two roles that is the focus of this
paper.
3. Experimental setup
The theoretical literature on the signaling effect of sanctions described above assumes that there is heterogeneity in the
preferences of agents. Moreover, information about the preferences of others is relevant for behavior due to the existence of
technological complementarities or social interdependencies (e.g. conformism). In this paper, we choose a slightly different
approach by selecting a simple coordination gamewithmultiple equilibria as an object of study. This allows us to investigate
directly the effect of sanctions on inferences about the other player’s behavior, as opposed to the preferences underlying that
behavior. We can also minimize the effects of social preferences since all players have the same ranking over equilibria.2
2 Social preferences such as an altruistic concern for other player’s payoffs could still play a role, but their inﬂuence is likely to be less pronounced than
in a prisoner’s dilemma or public good game, where there is an obvious conﬂict of interest between the players.
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a.1. The experimental game
As the coordination game underlying our experiment we choose the minimum effort game of Goeree and Holt (2001,
005). Large action spaces help capture variation in players’ beliefs. In this game, two players simultaneously choose an
ction, to be interpreted as an effort level, between 110 and 170 (the bounds are chosen such that there are no clear focal
oints). Subjects’ payoffs are equal to the minimum of these two efforts, minus the amount of their own effort times a cost
arameter k∈ [0, 1], which is the same for both players.
While in the original setting by Goeree and Holt (2001) the game is played only once, in our experiment the game
s played twice where treatments differ according to what happens in the second round. In some treatments a value F
s subtracted from the payoffs in the second round, where F=0.5 · (170− ei). The subtraction of F can be interpreted as a
anction, since deviations from the maximal effort (170) are punished proportionally. The sanction is ‘mild’, as the game
emains a coordination game with the same set of pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Another difference to Goeree and Holt (2001) is that we include a third player who is either active or inactive, depending
n the treatment. When active, the third player can choose before the start of the second round whether or not to introduce
sanction for both players in the group. When inactive, the third player does not make any choice, instead the choice of
hether to introduce a sanction is made by the experimenter. Regardless of her activity status, player 3 receives a payoff
roportional to the minimum-effort chosen by the other two players. Note that player 3 is present in each treatment to
aintain the same context.
In sum, payoffs in round 1 are determined as follows:
i(ei, e−i) = min{ei, e−i} − 0.85 · ei for i = 1,2,
3(e1, e2) = 0.25 · min{e1, e2},
here i(e1, e2) is the payoff of player i, ei ∈ [110, 170] is the effort level chosen by player i, i=1, 2, and k=0.85 is the cost of
ffort. Payoffs in round 2 are given by the following equations:
i(ei, e−i, s) = min{ei, e−i} − 0.85 · ei − s ·0.5 · (170 − ei) for i = 1,2,
3(e1, e2, s) = 0.25 · min{e1, e2} − 4s,
here 4 is the cost of introducing a sanction for the third player and s∈ {0, 1} reﬂects whether a sanction was introduced
s=1) or not (s=0).
An important element of the experimental design is the information structure. Players do not know before the ﬁrst round
hat there will be a second round. They are informed of this only after the ﬁrst round has concluded. Furthermore, players
and 2 do not observe each other’s effort levels, nor do they learn their own payoffs before both rounds are over. When
ctive, player 3 is informed about the effort levels of players 1 and 2 in round 1. Players 1 and 2 only observe before round
starts whether or not player 3 has chosen to introduce a sanction.
.1.1. Parameters, treatments, and procedures
The experiment was conducted at the economics lab of the University of Siena, Italy between May and November 2007,
sing the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Within each session subjects were matched into groups of 3, faced the same
reatment and played the two round game described above a single time. Before playing the game the instructions were
ead out loud and a tutorial was conducted. The subjects received a show up fee of 1 euro, their earnings were in tokens as
peciﬁed above, which were converted into Euro’s at the end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 10 tokens = 0.75 Euro.
We set the cost of effort k=0.85, i.e. rather high to induce low effort choices. Sanctioning should be moderately costly
or player 3 so that there is sufﬁcient diversity in the choices of player 3. Accordingly we chose to set the cost for the third
layer of introducing a sanction equal to 4, which is comparable to a reduction of 4/0.25=16 in the minimal effort of players
and 2.
We now describe the treatments. Instructions can be found at in Appendix E. Treatments are all the same in the ﬁrst
ound: players 1 and 2 play the minimum effort game and player 3 is inactive. In the control treatment there is no sanction
n the second round, and player 3 is inactive. That is, the second round is conducted exactly as the ﬁrst. In particular subjects
re not aware of the fact that sanctions are introduced in other treatments. We refer to this treatment as the ‘exogenous
no-sanction’ (ExNS) treatment. In the treatment we refer to as the ‘exogenous sanction’ (ExS) treatment, the sanction is
introduced in the second round. Players 1 and 2 are told that the term F is subtracted from their payoffs; player 3 remains
inactive, as in ExNS. We use the term exogenous to indicate that introduction of a sanction is not conditional in any way
on previous decisions by the subjects. This was clear to the subjects because all subjects that belonged to the same session
received the same instructions and this was common knowledge as instructions were read publicly.The ‘endogenous’ treatment is the only one in which player 3 has an active role. After round 1, player 3 observes the
effort levels chosen by players 1 and 2 in the ﬁrst round, whereupon she is asked to decide whether to (a) introduce the
sanction F to the payoffs of players 1 and 2 at a cost 4 to her own payoffs, or (b) to leave the payoff structure unaltered.
After player 3 has taken her decision, players 1 and 2 are informed of it and choose their effort levels. With some abuse of
the word ‘treatment’ we refer to the case where player 3 did (not) introduce the sanction as the endogenous (no) sanction
treatment (EnS, EnNS).
Because the experiment features just two rounds of play, itwas very important that people understood the game correctly
from the start. For this purpose, before subjects were assigned to a role, we ran a tutorial where participants had 5min to
choose hypothetical effort choices of players 1 and 2 and to calculate their payoffs resulting from these choices. In addition
to this tutorial, the input screens in the actual experiment provided subjects with the possibility to calculate their payoffs
from a given set of choices.
3.1.2. Elicitation of a belief interval
Becausewe are interested in the subjects’ beliefs,we ask players 1 and2 about their beliefs about the effort of their partner
in each round. In a minimal effort game, it is not just the expected effort level of the other player that is of interest, but also
the downward deviations from this level. Moreover, we are interested in how uncertainty differs between treatments and
rounds. We capture both of these features of beliefs by eliciting conﬁdence intervals about the partner’s effort.
More precisely, players 1 and 2 have to specify an interval (i.e. a lower bound L and an upper bound U) in which the effort
chosen by the other player is believed to fall. Elicitation is remunerated as follows:
i(L, U, e−i) =
{
0 if e−i /∈ [L, U]
0.15 · (60 − (U − L)) if e−i ∈ [L, U]
wherei(L,U, e−i) is the payoff of player iwho speciﬁes a range [L,U]when e−i is the effort chosen by the playermatchedwith
player i. Note that a smaller interval increases the payoff of a correct guess but also increases the risk of not being correct and
obtaining no tokens. Schlag and van der Weele (2011) show that this rule incentivizes subjects who are risk neutral or risk
averse to specify an interval that contains the partner’s effort choice with a probability of at least 50%. Moreover, increased
uncertainty about the partner’s effort (a more dispersed belief distribution) leads to the speciﬁcation of a wider interval.
In the following, we focus on the lower bound of the belief interval since variation is largest for this variable, but results
are similar if we use the midpoint of the interval instead. Thus, in the following, the term belief refers to the value of L. In
addition, to understand how uncertainty changes between rounds and differs between treatments we consider the width
of the interval U− L.
4. Hypotheses
The hypotheses we present in this section are based on a simple model. We believe that the intuitions from this model
are relatively straightforward, so we relegate a formal treatment of the model to Appendix A.
In contrast to the theoretical literature on this topic, which assumes heterogenous preferences of agents, we base our
hypotheses on a model where there is heterogeneity in beliefs only. Since the game has many equilibria, we use a level-k
thinking model (Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006) to generate predictions. Speciﬁcally, we assume that each
player assumes that the other player (or ‘partner’) is best responding to one of two distinct belief distributions that are ﬁxed
over time. As a consequence, players believe that their partner chooses one of two effort levels which we refer to as ‘high’
effort and ‘low’ effort.
Consider ﬁrst choices in round one. Following the fact that subjects did not know that there would be a second round, we
ignore strategic considerationswith respect to round two. For simplicity, players are assumed to be risk neutral. Therefore, in
round one, a player will choose between the same two effort levels that the partner is believed to be choosing. In particular,
the high effort is chosen if and only if the probability that the partner is choosing this effort is sufﬁciently high.
Consider now round two. As choices will depend on the treatment, we ﬁrst look at exogenous sanctions. The sanction
reduces the marginal cost of effort which results in both an incentive and a belief effect. The incentive effect describes the
change in behavior that results if beliefs would remain unchanged. Lower marginal effort costs means that some players
have an incentive to switch from low to high effort while none will switch from high to low effort. The belief effect refers to
the change in behavior driven by players changing their beliefs about their partner’s behavior. Players anticipate that their
potential partner will exert higher effort (through the incentive effect) which additionally increases their own incentive to
increase their effort. Because each player assumes that the partner best-responds to ﬁxed belief distributions, no further
iterations in strategic reasoning are necessary.
It follows that an exogenous sanction will increase both own effort and the beliefs about the effort of the other player.
Under a mild assumption on the consistency of beliefs in round one (as speciﬁed in the appendix), the average effort of the
players increases more than their average beliefs do. The reason for this is that effort is increased through both the incentive
and the belief effect, whereas beliefs are only affected by the latter. This leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Exogenous sanctions increase beliefs and efforts. This effect is more pronounced for effort levels than it is
for belief levels.
Consider now the treatment with endogenous sanctions. We wish to determine when the third player, or principal, will
choose to sanction and how players 1 and 2 will react to the (non-)introduction of sanctions. We focus on behavior that can
be sustained in a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for any prior beliefs of the principal about the beliefs of the agents. We
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(nd three candidate equilibrium behaviors for the third player: “always sanction”, “never sanction” and “sanction when at
east one player exerts low effort”. For instance, unconditional sanctioning is best if sanctions raise effort sufﬁciently to offset
he cost for the third player. For this to happen, the third player has to anticipate an increase in minimum effort by at least
/0.25=16 points as a result of the sanction. The equilibrium involving “sanction when at least one player exerts low effort”
xists when (i) a player with low effort is sufﬁciently responsive to a sanction and (ii) the difference in effort between low
nd high effort players is sufﬁciently large. The intuition behind these equilibrium conditions will become clearer below.
Common to these equilibrium strategies is that low efforts are always sanctioned if sanctions are chosen. This leads to
ur next hypothesis.
ypothesis 2. In the endogenous treatment, the likelihood of sanctions being imposed by the principal is decreasing in the
inimal effort chosen in the ﬁrst round.
We now turn to the reaction of players one and two to the sanctioning choice, which naturally depends on the principal’s
quilibrium policy. In the “always sanction” or “never sanction” equilibrium, no information about partner behavior is
ransmitted to the players. In this case, endogenous sanctions have the same effect as exogenous sanctions. Information
bout partner behavior is transmitted only under “sanction when at least one player exerts low effort”, and it is only
ransmitted to a player who exerted high effort. In this equilibrium, absence of a sanction reveals to a player with high
ffort that the matched partner exerted high effort, while a sanction informs the player that his or her partner chose low
ffort. On the other hand, players that exerted low effort are sanctioned regardless of the behavior of their partner. Thus,
anctions are ‘bad news’ for someone who chose high effort in the ﬁrst round and carry no news for those that chose low
ffort.
In summary, we can say that a sanction is never good news about the effort of the partner, and is bad news when own
ffort is high and the third player is believed to “sanction if at least one player exerted low effort”. Careful inspection of the
quilibrium behavior of agents leads to the following hypotheses.
ypothesis 3. (a) For those that chose a low effort in the ﬁrst round, the change in efforts and beliefs under endogenous
anctionswill be similar to the change under exogenous sanctions. (b) For those that chose a high effort in the ﬁrst round, the
hange in efforts and beliefs will be larger under exogenous sanctions than under endogenous sanctions. (c) On aggregate,
he change in efforts and beliefs will be larger under exogenous sanctions than under endogenous sanctions.
Note that the model also predicts that effort among those not sanctioned will not change. However, we do not formally
est this hypothesis as our primary interest is the effect of sanctions.
. Results
The number of participants in the experiment was 243: 45 in the ExNS treatment, 51 in the ExS treatment, and 147 in
he endogenous treatment where the principal decided to introduce a sanction in 29 out of 49 groups. Each experimental
ession lasted roughly 35min and the subjects earned 7.5 euros on average.3 As mentioned above, participants engaged in
5-min tutorial before starting the experiment and being assigned to a role. As an indication of whether people understood
he game, we checked whether there were ‘anomalous observations’: people who speciﬁed an effort choice above the upper
ound of their belief interval. We found just 6 such observations. In fact, there is a high correlation between beliefs (as
dentiﬁed by the lower bound L of the elicited belief interval) and efforts in the ﬁrst round of each treatment, as one would
xpect in a minimum-effort game. The correlation coefﬁcient is 0.85, which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.4
Fig. 1 shows a histogram of ﬁrst-round effort choices. Average effort in round one across all treatments was 145 with
large clustering of observations around 170 and a smaller cluster around 110. Further descriptive statistics are given in
ppendix C.
Before we move to test the hypotheses formulated in Section4, some comments on methodology are in order. First, we
refer not to add any unwarranted distributional or parametric assumptions, in particular as our sample sizes are small.
ur main analysis is based on new nonparametric tests for ‘stochastic inequality’ that enable correct inference for the given
ample sizes and that have been speciﬁcally designed for small samples (Schlag 2008).5 The power of these tests stems
rom the fact that they are based on ordinal comparisons and hence are less sensitive to outliers, as is explained in more
3 If this seems to be little, remember that the incentives were concentrated on only two (effort) choices. At each of these choices there was thus relatively
lot at stake.
4 The signiﬁcance is based on an exact test of Schlag (2008) which has as null hypothesis that the covariance is less than 0. Note that this is not the null
ypothesis underlying the Spearman rank correlation test (Spearman, 1904).
5 Software for the implementationof these tests canbedownloaded fromhttp://homepage.univie.ac.at/karl.schlag/.Note that all our results are consistent
ith those that can be obtained using the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney (WMW) test. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, the WMW test is not an
xact test for comparing means unless one is willing to assume that any two random variables that are not identically distributed have different means
for a counterexample, see Forsythe et al., 1994).
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Fig. 1. Histogram of ﬁrst-round effort choices.
detail in Appendix B.6 Since these tests cannot account for potential endogeneity problems, we revisit our analysis within a
parametric framework in Section5.4. The results of the two different methodologies are consistent with each other.
Second, our hypotheses are framed in termsof changes in these variables between roundone and two rather than absolute
levels. Thus, our main (nonparametric) analysis is based on comparing differences. To indicate changes between the two
rounds of a variable in treatment X we use the notation dX.
Third, interpreting changes in efforts and belief at the boundary of the interval is problematic. Our predictions are that
subjects raise their effort in a reaction to the introduction of exogenous sanctions. However, people who chose effort very
close to 170 in the ﬁrst round will not be able to move up their effort any further. The behavior of these subjects is therefore
not informative about the effect of sanctions. Furthermore, these individuals have a lot of room to move down, so that mean
reversion may play an exaggerated role. Thus, we restrict attention to those subjects who can respond to incentives in either
direction, and choose a ﬁrst-round effort below an upper bound of 165 (indicated in Fig. 1) in our analysis of efforts and ﬁrst
round beliefs below 165 in our analysis of beliefs.7 The results are robust to changes in this threshold.8 Consequently, the
number of observations of beliefs and effort may differ due to a different number of observations above the threshold.
Fourth, our hypotheses instruct us to condition on ﬁrst-round effort, so we differentiate between subjects with high and
low ﬁrst-round effort. As cutoff between the two regions we consider the sample median effort of the remaining subjects in
round one which is 135. Thus, in the remainder we deﬁne high effort players as those who chose effort in the ﬁrst round in
{135, . . ., 165} (i.e. above the median), and low effort players as those chose ﬁrst-round effort in {110, . . ., 134} (i.e. below
the median).
Finally, the observations for the group members in the endogenous treatment are not necessarily independent. The effort
decision of a subject in the ﬁrst round can inﬂuence the sanctioning decision of the third player. This in turn can inﬂuence
the effort and beliefs of the other subject in the second round. In our statistical testing we correct for this dependence by
considering the average effort/belief level within each group whenever the sample contains two players from the same
group (which may not always be the case since we split the sample between high and low effort players).
5.1. The incentive effect of sanctions
In order to identify the incentive effect of sanctions (Question 1), we compare behavior in the exogenous no-sanction
(ExNS) treatment to that in the exogenous sanction treatment (ExS). Fig. 2 shows the change in the mean belief and mean
effort between round 1 and round 2 for both treatments. The number on top of the bar indicates the number of independent
observations.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 1 we report the estimated stochastic differences between the change in ExNS and the change
in ExS with their respective signiﬁcant levels. The estimated stochastic difference equals 0.64, and we are able to reject the
6 Formally, given two random variables Y1 and Y2, the stochastic difference between Y1 and Y2 is given by ı(Y1, Y2) = Pr(Y2 >Y1)−Pr(Y2 <Y1). We thus test
the null hypothesis that Pr(Y2 >Y1)≤Pr(Y2 <Y1). A rejection presents evidence that data drawn from Y2 tends to be larger than data drawn from Y1.
7 Those with ﬁrst-round effort near 110 also face a constraint, but this is less problematic since we hypothesize that people move up in reaction to
incentives. In fact, subjects do not seem to be constrained. We ﬁnd that no subjects with low effort (see below) in the ﬁrst round decreased their effort and
only 3 subjects who had low beliefs in the ﬁrst round decreased their beliefs in round two.
8 Our focus on subjects with ﬁrst-round effort below 165 eliminates 39 effort observations and 11 belief observations, including two extreme outliers
in the ExS treatment, with changes in effort equal to −60 and −51. The results of our non-parametric tests hold for any upper bound between 165 and
168, when we take the median of the associated sample as a threshold between high and low effort players. They do not hold if we include the spike of
observations at 170, which results in a large number of no-change observations which swamp the statistical differences between treatments.
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cig. 2. The change in beliefs and sanctions for those who chose ﬁrst-round efforts ∈{110, 111, . . ., 165} or ﬁrst round beliefs ∈{110, 111, . . ., 165}. The
umber of independent observations for each sample is at the top of the bar.
ull hypothesis that the stochastic differences is nonpositive at a signiﬁcance level of 1%. The impact of sanctions on the
hange in beliefs is only marginally signiﬁcant (10%). Thus, it seems that sanctions have a stronger impact on efforts than
hey do on beliefs. Testing this formally, we ﬁnd that the null hypothesis that the change is equal or higher for beliefs is
ejected at the 10% level, with the stochastic difference being 0.35.
ummary 1. Regarding Hypothesis 1, we ﬁnd a strongly signiﬁcant incentive effect of sanctions on effort and a marginally
igniﬁcant belief effect. There is marginally signiﬁcant evidence that the effect is stronger for effort than it is for beliefs.
Fig. 2 also suggests that average beliefs and efforts increase even in the absence of sanctions. The second columnof Table 1
ests whether this effect is signiﬁcant, where ExNS1 (ExNS2) denotes the ﬁrst (second) round choices in the exogenous no-
anction treatment. Here, a test of the null hypothesis that stochastic difference is 0 can be performed with a sign test. We
nd no marginally signiﬁcant difference for effort (the WMW test also does not detect any statistically signiﬁcant difference
t 10%). On the other hand we do ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that the beliefs tend to be higher in the second round. However,
he changes in beliefs are sufﬁciently small that people do not change their effort levels by much.
.2. The signaling effect of sanctions
The second main objective of this paper is to investigate the signaling effect of sanctions. To this end we study behavior
n the endogenous treatment, using the exogenous treatments as controls. Signaling occurs when the principal conditions
he choice of whether to sanction on the effort levels of the two players chosen in round one. Signaling has an effect when
ubjects make inferences about the effort of the other player when observing the choice of the principal whether or not
o sanction. Note that the information contained in the choice of the principal need not be consistent with how subjects
nterpret why the principal chose to or not to sanction. Therefore, we separately analyze (i) the sanctioning choice of the
rincipal and (ii) how subjects react to the choice of the principal.
.2.1. The sanctioning decision
We wish to uncover regularities in the sanctioning choice of the principal. In particular, Hypothesis 2 predicts that
anctions are more likely when the minimal effort in round one is low. In order to test Hypothesis 2, we compare the
inimum ﬁrst-round effort in the sanctioned groups to the minimum ﬁrst-round effort of non-sanctioned groups in the
ndogenous treatment.
able 1
olumn one shows values of stochastic difference and their signiﬁcance level as deﬁned in footnote 6 between changes in the ExNS treatment (dExNS) and
hanges in the ExS treatment (dExS). Similarly, Column 2 compares round 1 and round 2 in the ExNS treatment.
Stochastic difference
dExNS vs. dExS ExNS1 vs. ExNS2
Effort 0.64*** 0.22
Belief 0.31* 0.34**
* p<0.10.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
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When we compare the minimum group effort between the sanctioned and the non-sanctioned groups, we see that the
group effort is slightly lower on average in sanctioned groups (135 vs. 138). However, using a Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney
(WMW) test, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant evidence that the distributions of minimal effort are different between the two
groups (p=0.63). Since the samples are small, the test is not very powerful. A Probit regression of the probability to sanction
yields a negative but insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient for minimum effort (p=0.80).
Summary 2. Although the minimum-effort group effort is lower on average in sanctioned groups, we ﬁnd no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. We cannot reject the hypothesis that sanctions have been imposed
independently of the minimum-effort.
There may be several explanations why we cannot conﬁrm Hypothesis 2. One explanation for the lack of pattern may
be the established tendency of people to sanction “too often” in economic experiments (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). This
would explain why we occasionally observe sanctions even if the minimum-effort was quite high. Note however that this
result does not contradict our theoretical framework outlined in Appendix A, since this admits equilibria in which sanctions
are chosen independent of effort levels.
5.2.2. The effect of endogenous sanctions
Wenowturn to investigatewhether subjectsperceivean informational content in the choiceof theprincipal by comparing
behavior in the ExS and EnS treatments. Note that there is a potential confound due to the endogenous nature of the EnS
treatment. Even though we could not detect a signiﬁcant relation between minimum effort in round one and the imposition
of a sanction, we cannot rule out that there is such an effect. Moreover, the principals may have systematically used some
other feature of ﬁrst round effort in the sanctioning decision, a feature which may drive behavior in the second round. Here
we ignore this endogeneity issue, since it is hard to solve with non-parametric tests, and come back to it in Section5.4 where
we address it using regression analysis.
Although our analysis above indicates that the actual informational content in the sanction is small, subjects may still
believe that sanctions are imposed as a reaction to low minimum-effort levels. Speciﬁcally, subjects may follow the same
reasoning that led us to formulate Hypothesis 2. If this is the case, sanctions will inﬂuence beliefs about the other group
member, and the predicted effect depends on whether a subject chose low or high effort in round one. We now investigate
separately the behavior of low and high effort players. Descriptive statistics for these samples can be found in Appendix C.
Low effort players. Consider the behavior of low effort players. The left panel of Fig. 3 presents the mean changes in beliefs
and effort for people who chose low effort in the ﬁrst round. It reveals no large differences between the exogenous and
endogenous sanction treatments.
The ﬁrst column in Table 2 shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of identical distributions in the exogenous
and endogenous treatments, using the WMW test, both for effort and beliefs.The fact that we are not able to reject the null hypothesis does not mean that there is no effect for low effort players.
To obtain more evidence regarding Hypothesis 3a, we contrast the stochastic difference of the change in behavior between
the two rounds of the two sanction treatments, reported in the second and third column of Table 2. Estimates and levels of
signiﬁcance are very similar.
Table 2
Comparison of exogenous and endogenous sanction treatment among those that chose low effort (∈{110, 111, . . ., 134}) in the ﬁrst round. First column:
p-values of the two-sided WMW test for no-difference hypothesis. Second and third column: stochastic difference between the ﬁrst and second round
effort in the ExS and EnS treatment, respectively.
WMW p-values Stochastic difference
dEnS vs. dExS ExS1 vs. ExS2 EnS1 vs. EnS2
Effort 0.29 1*** 1***
Belief 0.97 0.83** 0.93***
*p<0.10.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
Table 3
Comparison between the differences in the EnS and ExS treatments in the ﬁrst round (ﬁrst column), between the ExNS and EnS no sanction treatment
(second column) and between the ExNS and ExS treatment (third column), for those who played high effort (∈{135, 136, . . ., 165}).
Stochastic difference WMW p-value Stochastic difference
dEnS vs. dExS dExNS vs. dEnS dExNS vs. dExS
Effort 0.66** 0.35 0.78***
Beliefs 0.39* 0.49 0.48**
* p<0.10.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
Table 4
Estimates of stochastic difference between the EnS and ExS treatment and the EnS and ExNS treatment for those who chose ﬁrst round effort ∈{110, 111,
. . ., 165}.
Stochastic difference
dEnS vs. dExS dEnS vs. dExNS
Effort 0.4** 0.34*
Belief 0.13 0.21
*
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ummary3. RegardingHypothesis 3a, for subjectswhochose lowefforts in theﬁrst roundweﬁndno statistically signiﬁcant
vidence that endogenous and exogenous sanctions have different effects on either efforts or beliefs. There is some indication
hat lack of signiﬁcant difference is not due to small sample sizes but that in fact behavior is the same under endogenous
nd exogenous sanctions.
igh effort players. Consider now thebehavior of high effort players. In the secondpanel of Fig. 3we report average changes in
fforts and beliefs across treatments for subjects who chose high effort and beliefs in the ﬁrst round. In line with Hypothesis
c, exogenous sanctions seem to raise effort and beliefs more than endogenous sanctions in this sample. Our statistical
nalysis based on stochastic differences, reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 3, conﬁrms this with respect to effort and
somewhat less signiﬁcantly) beliefs.
One might wonder whether endogenous sanctions have any effect at all. To ﬁnd out, we test if there is a difference
etween the EnS and the ExNS treatment. In the second column of Table 3 we report the p-values of the WMW test for this
omparison. There is no statistically signiﬁcant evidence that endogenous sanctions raise effort amongst high effort players
a test for stochastic difference is similarly insigniﬁcant). However, the sample sizes are small, so it is possible that we would
ot be able to reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions, even if the actual difference is quite large. The last column of
able 3 shows the stochastic difference when the sanction is imposed exogenously. Despite the small sample sizes, we ﬁnd
tatistically signiﬁcant evidence that exogenous sanctions are effective among the high effort players.
ummary 4. Regarding Hypothesis 3b, for subjects who chose high effort in the ﬁrst round, endogenous sanctions are
igniﬁcantly less effective in raising efforts and beliefs than exogenous sanctions. In fact, the effect of endogenous sanctions
annot be distinguished from the effect of not introducing a sanction.
ggregate effect of endogenous sanctions. We now consider the effect of endogenous sanctions for both low and high effort
layers combined. In linewith Hypothesis 3c, the right panel of Fig. 3 shows that themean change of effort is almost twice as
arge under exogenous sanctions as it is under endogenous sanctions (25.8 vs. 13.6). The ﬁrst column of Table 4 shows that
xogenous sanctions tend to raise effort more than endogenous sanctions. The effect for beliefs goes in the same direction,
ut is not signiﬁcant.
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Interval Width Mean Comparison by TreatmentFig. 4. Means of change in the width of the interval across treatments, for those who chose the lower belief interval in the ﬁrst round in (∈{110, 111, . . .,
165}) in the ﬁrst round (number of independent observations for each sample at the top of the bar).
Relative to the no-sanction case, the second column of Table 4 shows marginally signiﬁcant evidence that endogenous
sanctions tend to raise effort. Changes in beliefs are not signiﬁcantly different from the no-sanction case. Note that this
evidence for the effectiveness of endogenous sanctions is much weaker than the corresponding evidence for exogenous
sanctions reported in Table 1. Thus, aswas to be expected, the aggregate results fall in between the results derived separately
for the low and high effort players.
Summary 5. Regarding Hypothesis 3c, we ﬁnd that endogenous sanctions are signiﬁcantly less effective in raising efforts
than exogenous sanctions, but do not ﬁnd similar effects for beliefs.
5.3. Sanctions and uncertainty
One of the reasons we asked the participants to specify an interval rather than a point belief was that the elicited interval
provides some indication of the uncertainty about the behavior of the other player. Schlag and van der Weele (2011) show
formally that if subjectsmaximize expectedutility, changes in thewidth of the interval are a proxy for changes in uncertainty.
Fig. 4 shows the changes in the width of the belief interval for those who chose L in {110, 111, . . ., 165} in the ﬁrst round.
Uncertainty did not change between rounds in both no-sanction treatments, while uncertainty went down in both sanction
treatments.
Statistical analysis conﬁrms these results. In the no-sanction treatments a test of stochastic inequality cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the distributions in the two rounds are equal at the 10% level. By contrast, we ﬁnd that there is signiﬁcant
evidence (at the 5% level) that the interval decreases under exogenous sanctions and marginally signiﬁcant evidence (at the
10% level) that the interval decreases under endogenous sanctions. This reinforces our conclusion that sanctions facilitate
coordination partly by reducing uncertainty about the behavior of others.
If sanctionswere tohave a signaling effect,wewould expect for those subjectswhochosehigh effort in theﬁrst round, that
the reduction in uncertainty is smaller under endogenous sanctions than under exogenous sanctions. Testing the direction
of the effect with stochastic inequality, we ﬁnd a strongly signiﬁcant decrease in uncertainty at 1% in the exogenous sanction
treatment, while under endogenous sanctions it is no longer signiﬁcant.
Summary 6. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that uncertainty about the choice of the other player is reduced when sanctions
are imposed. This is also true within the subset of high effort players when the sanction is exogenous. No statistical evidence
of a reduction in uncertainty is found in absence of sanctions or among high effort players when the sanction is introduced
endogenously.
5.4. Discussion
In this section we present further evidence related to alternative interpretations of the results. We ﬁrst ask whether the
results could be driven by the principal’s selection of whom to sanction, and then consider whether negative reciprocity
towards the principal may play a role.5.4.1. Endogeneity of sanctions
Inherent in our experimental design is that sanctions are implemented endogenously in some of the treatments and not
in others. Although we could not reject the hypothesis that sanctions were implemented independently from the minimum
Table 5
Regression analysis of the effect of exogenous and endogenous sanctions on second round efforts and beliefs, assuming homoskedastic errors. All speciﬁ-
cations include dummies for each level of ﬁrst round effort. Sanction (or “S”) is a dummy that is 1 in the EnS and ExS treatment and 0 otherwise, “Endo”
indicates a dummy that is 1 for the EnS and EnNS treatment and 0 otherwise, “Effort1[x,y]” is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if ﬁrst round effort is in the
interval [x, y], and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (clustered by group in the endogenous treatment) in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effort R2 Beliefs R2 Effort R2 Beliefs R2 Effort R2 Beliefs R2
Belief Round 1 0.257 0.479** 0.0636 0.397* 0.0872 0.386*
(0.227) (0.199) (0.211) (0.202) (0.224) (0.213)
Interval width Round 1 0.149 −0.184 −0.0313 −0.286 −0.0275 −0.304
(0.226) (0.220) (0.215) (0.225) (0.233) (0.236)
Sanction 8.959* 8.712** 97.23*** 46.34*
(4.742) (3.509) (27.02) (24.76)
S×Endo −1.295 −1.267 −22.56 14.21
(4.964) (4.014) (36.62) (31.14)
S × Effort1 −0.605*** −0.254
(0.192) (0.158)
S × Endo × Effort1 0.157 −0.102
(0.243) (0.195)
S × Effort1[110,134] 23.60*** 16.94**
(6.659) (7.606)
S × Endo × Effort1[110,134] −0.407 2.340
(9.032) (8.925)
S × Effort1[135,165] 13.69*** 8.383**
(5.208) (3.619)
S × Endo × Effort1[135,165] −12.40*** −4.746
(4.540) (3.770)
S × Effort1[166,170] −6.020 3.622
(9.109) (4.350)
S × Endo × Effort1[166,170] 9.771 −2.016
(8.698) (2.981)
Observations 162 162 162 162 162 162
R2 0.482 0.595 0.554 0.604 0.556 0.607
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ffort in the ﬁrst round, it may nevertheless be that the sample of subjects sanctioned by the principal is somehow different
rom the sample in the ExS treatment. A simple comparison ﬁnds that average ﬁrst round effort levels are slightly higher
n the EnS than in the ExS treatment (144.8 vs. 139.6). However, a WMW test does not reject the hypothesis that the two
istributions are the same p=0.43. Obviously, this does not prove that there is no endogeneity, but it does mean subjects in
oth treatments had similar ﬁrst round effort levels.
Sincenonparametricmethods toaddress this endogeneityproblemdonot exist,weuseparametricmethods, acknowledg-
ng that these are based on assumptions thatmay not hold here.9 We control for the possibility that differences in ﬁrst-round
hoicesmay drive our treatment effects by running a series of OLS regressions, reported in Table 5.10 The dependent variable
s second round effort (odd columns) or beliefs (even columns). The dummy “Sanction” (or “S”) is equal to 1 for the EnS and
xS treatment (and 0 otherwise), and “Endo” is 1 for the EnS and EnNS treatment (and 0 otherwise).11
To control for any effects that are due to ﬁrst round choices, we include the interval width, ﬁrst round beliefs as well as
series of 71 dummies for each level of ﬁrst round effort (the coefﬁcients are not reported for reasons of space). To account
or the interdependence of observations, we cluster standard errors by group in the endogenous treatment.
The ﬁrst two columns show that sanctions have a marginally signiﬁcant effect on second round effort and a signiﬁcant
ffect on second round beliefs, in line with Hypothesis 1. The additional effect of the endogeneity of sanctions is negative
ut not signiﬁcant. When we control for the interaction of sanctions and ﬁrst round effort in columns 3 and 4, we see a much
tronger effect of sanctions on effort. The signiﬁcant and negative coefﬁcient on the interaction term indicates that higher
fforts reduce second round effort in the sanction treatments, possibly because there is less space to move up. There is no
igniﬁcant difference in this effect between exogenous and endogenous sanctions.
In the last two columns we investigate the interaction of the sanction with a dummy if effort is either ‘low’ or ‘high’.
n line with Hypothesis 3, and consistent with the nonparametric analysis, for the low effort players we see a strong effect
f sanctions and no signiﬁcant negative effect of the endogeneity of sanctions. For the high effort players, we see a strong
ositive effect of sanctions which is almost entirely canceled out by a strong negative effect when sanctions are introduced
9 In particular, the assumption of homoskedastic errors may fail, and it is not clear that that our sample size is large enough for asymptotic theory to
ustify the assumption of normally distributed errors.
10 A series of Tobit regressions accounting for the fact that subjects were constrained to the interval [110, 170] yields very similar results.
11 We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments related to these models.
endogenously. Note that for effort in the interval [165, 170] there is no signiﬁcant effect. The reversal of the signs for the
endogenous and exogenous sanction is driven by two rather extreme outliers in the ExS treatment (see footnote 8), and does
not occur for beliefs.
5.4.2. Can negative reciprocity explain the results?
There is analternativepotential explanation for thedifferencebetween theeffect of endogenousandexogenous sanctions.
Although the sanctiondoesnot operate retroactively, and the incentives of all players are aligned, subjects couldnevertheless
interpret the introduction of an endogenous sanction as an unkind act by the principal. If agents have reciprocal preferences,
they may retaliate by reducing their effort in order to lower the payoffs of the principal.
If such retaliation drives the results, we should observe that subjects’ effort choices deviate downward from their beliefs
about the other player’s effort in the EnS treatment.12 One could test this in several ways. A non-parametric measure of
punishment is the difference between effort and the lower bound of beliefs. If subjects wanted to punish the principal, we
expect that more of them play efforts below the lower bound of the belief interval. In Fig. 5 in Appendix D, we show effort
minus the lower bound of the belief interval in the second round for all treatments. The ﬁgure shows no clearly different
pattern in the endogenous sanction treatment than in the other treatments.
A second test is to regress the change in effort on the change in beliefs, and dummies for treatment effects. If punishment
plays a role, the endogenous sanction treatment should have an effect on effort changes that is not captured by the changes
in beliefs. The results in Table 7 in Appendix D, show that the coefﬁcient for the change in belief is signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
but the coefﬁcients for the treatment effects are insigniﬁcant. This result indicates that all treatment effects go through the
change in beliefs about the effort of the other player. Thus, we conclude that retaliation against the principal does not play
an important role in our experiment.
6. Conclusion
The results of our experiment show that sanctions have a positive effect on effort levels and beliefs about others’ effort
level for those that chose low effort in the ﬁrst round. For those that chose high effort their effect depends on whether
sanctions were imposed exogenously or endogenously. Exogenous sanctions raise effort signiﬁcantly, whereas endogenous
sanctions do not have any effect.
These results can be explained by the signaling theory underlying our hypotheses. Subjects with high effort in round
one interpret the sanction as a signal that their partner did not ‘cooperate’, i.e. she selected low effort. This explains why
endogenous sanctions do not raise their beliefs about the effort of their partner in the next round. It also explains why for
those with low effort in the ﬁrst round, the effect of the sanction is independent of endogeneity. For them there is no signal,
as the sanction would be imposed independently of their partner’s behavior.
Comparing our experiment to the previous literature on endogenous sanctions, our experiment complements the results
on democratically implemented sanctions mentioned in the introduction. This literature shows that introducing sanctions
endogenously through voting raises expectations of cooperation and the effectiveness of such sanctions. Relative to this
literature, our setup reﬂects more closely the arrangements of a society where laws are made by authorities, rather than
by direct voting. In this setting, the superior information of the authority reverses the signaling effect, and sanctions are
more effective when introduced exogenously. Note that the two effects are not mutually exclusive. In fact, in so far as the the
decision to put a vote on the agenda in the ﬁrst place is endogenous, our results suggest that even voting procedures may
have adverse signaling effects.
Assuming some external validity, we believe our results have relevance for both public policies and manager-employee
relationships in ﬁrms. For example, Brandts and Cooper (2006) stresses the relevance of coordination and the existence of
inefﬁcient equilibria for corporations and other organizations. The existence of signaling effects means authorities need to
strike a balance between correcting the behavior of deviants or pessimists on the one hand, and maintaining the optimistic
beliefs of cooperators on the other.
Finally, we hope to promote the use the elicitation of belief intervals, as well as statistical tests that are exact but do not,
like the WMW test, impose additional distributional assumptions. We think these tests are an important addition to the
toolbox of economists, in particular when working with small data sets.
Appendix A: A simple model and hypotheses
In this section we present a simple model of behavior for the game speciﬁed in Section3.1. A summary is provided in
Section4.We ﬁrst predict behavior for the case where the third player does not have an active role. To generate predictions we
make the following assumptions. Players believe that they are more sophisticated than the player they are matched with
(whom we also call ‘partner’) and best respond to anticipated effort of their partner. Partners are believed to best respond to
12 We thank Samuel Bowles for this suggestion.
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lgiven belief distribution of effort levelswhere these beliefs do not change over time. Thus, the sophistication of players is as
n the models of level k thinking or cognitive hierarchy (Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006). In the terminology
f these models, all players in our paper belong to level 2.13
Partners best respond to one of two different belief distributions Gh and Gl, where we assume that Gh that Gl is ‘higher’
han Gl (e.g. Gh stochastically dominates Gl). Accordingly some partners choose high while others choose low effort, and
hey are referred to as high types and low types, respectively. Each player assesses a probability or belief p that her partner
s the high type. Players and partners are risk-neutral. Finally, players choose their effort levels in the ﬁrst round as if there
as no second round, so completely myopically. This is in accordance with the experimental setup, where people did not
now in the ﬁrst round that there would be a second round.
.1. First-round effort
To determine her effort in the ﬁrst round, a playerwill ﬁrst calculate the optimal effort of the high type and of the low type
artner and then choose a best response on the basis of the probability p of meeting the high type. Denote the optimal effort
evels of the high and low type when there is no sanction by eh(0) and el(0), respectively, where 0 indicates that there is no
anction (in later sections a 1 will indicate that a sanction has been imposed). So eh(0) ∈ argmax
e
(∫
min{e, e′}dGh(e′) − ke
)
here the cost of effort k was equal to 0.85 in the experiment.We assume that Gh and Gl are such that eh(0) > el(0). According
o our assumptions, each player believes with probability p that she faces a partner who chooses eh(0) and with probability
−p a partner who chooses el(0). Let erp denote the optimal effort level of a player with belief p in round r, r=1, 2. Note that
1
p = el(0) if p=0 and e1p = eh(0) if p=1. Taking into account that e1p ∈ [el(0), eh(0)] holds for all p∈ [0, 1] we can write the
xpected utility of a player with belief p who exerts effort e∈ [el(0), eh(0)] as Eu=p(e− ke) + (1−p)(el(0)− ke) and obtain
d
de
Eu = p − k.
o if p> k then e1p = eh(0), if p< k then e1p = el(0).
.2. The effect of an exogenous sanction
We now consider choice of effort in round 2 when an exogenous sanction has been imposed. Imposing a sanction means
o subtract k1(170− e) from the payoff for some given k1 >0. In the experiment we set k1 =0.5. This change in payoffs
nﬂuences effort choices of the level 1 player. Let ev(1) be the optimal effort of type v ∈ {h, l} when there is a sanction.
o eh(1) ∈ argmax
e
(∫
min{e, e′}dGh(e′) − ke − k1(170 − e)
)
. Note that ev(1)≥ev(0) for v ∈ {h, l}, i.e. partners (are believed to)
xert more effort after a sanction has been imposed.
Expected utility of a player who exerts effort e≥ el(1) is now
Eu = p(e − ke − k1(170 − e)) + (1 − p)(el(1) − ke − k1(170 − e)).
ence, d/deEu=p− (k− k1). If p> k− k1 then e2p = eh(1), if p< k− k1 then e2p = el(1). Thus, all players exert weakly more effort
fter an exogenous sanction has been introduced.
We can decompose this change in effort into two effects. First, there is an incentive effect, because a sanction effectively
educes the cost of effort k and thus gives incentives for higher effort. Speciﬁcally, any player with p∈ (k− k1, k) chooses the
ffort of the high type in round 2 while they choose the effort of the low type in round 1. Players with p< k− k1 and p> k
hoose the same effort in round 2 as they do in round 1. Thus, taken over the whole sample, there will be a strict increase
n average effort as long as p∈ (k− k1, k) for at least some players. Second, there is a (forward looking) belief effect because
ntroducing a sanction leads to a belief that partners will choose a higher effort as they too face lower effort costs. This belief
ffect additionally raises the effort levels of the players. This belief effect will be strictly positive as long as Gl and Gh place
nough mass around the optimal choice.
We now compare the effect of a sanction on beliefs to their effect on effort levels. For this, we assume that players are
rawn from some distribution such that Gp describes the distribution of p. To simplify exposition, assume that Gp has no
oint masses and full support on [0, 1]. Then the expected beliefs (in terms of the expected effort of a partner) in round one
quals∫(peh(0) + (1 − p)el(0))dGp(p),
13 At the cost of substantial additional complexity, one could assume more sophisticated distribution of rationality levels. Speciﬁcally, specifying higher
evels of rationality would lead to more complex belief effects. We believe that the data do not justify the cost of such an analysis.
while the expected effort (of a player) in round one is equal to∫
e1pdGp(p) = Gp(k)el(0) + (1 − Gp(k))eh(0).
In order to make efforts and beliefs comparable in round two we impose a mild consistency requirement, namely that
expected beliefs equal expected effort in the ﬁrst round. Following the above this means that
∫
pdGp(p) = 1−Gp(k).
In round 2, invoking consistency, we ﬁnd that expected beliefs equal∫
(peh(1) + (1 − p)el(1))dGp(p) = Gp(k)el(1) + (1 − Gp(k))eh(1),
and that expected effort equals
Gp(k − k1)el(1) + (1 − Gp(k − k1))eh(1).
Comparing these two terms we conclude for round 2 that expected effort is higher than expected belief. Given that these
two expressions are by assumption equal in round 1 we obtain the following result.14
Result 1. Exogenous sanctions increase both beliefs and effort where effort increases more than beliefs.
Note in the treatment where no sanction is introduced in round 2, payoffs and beliefs remain unchanged and hence
e2p = e1p , i.e. efforts remain unchanged as well.
7.3. The effect of an endogenous sanction
Next we investigate behavior when it is the third player, who we refer to as principal, who chooses whether or not to
sanction. The principal’s payoffs are given by 0.25min {e1, e2}− cs where in our experiment we set c=4. Note that c/0.25=4c
is the cost of sanctioning in units of efforts. The principal is risk neutral and has a prior Gp over the possible values of belief
p held by the players.
We develop some notation. Let ep(s) be the optimal effort given belief p where s=1 (s=0) indicates that a sanction has
been imposed (has not been imposed). Let pi be the belief of player i, i=1, 2. Let pm =min {p1, p2} and px =max {p1, p2}. Let
s∗ : [110, 170]2 → {0, 1} be such that s∗(e1p1 , e1p2 ) is the choice of the principal of whether or not to sanction conditional on
observed effort level e1pi of player i in round 1, i=1, 2.
Choices in the ﬁrst round are assumed to bemyopic as players do not anticipate that therewill be a second round.Wewill
not consider deviations from such play. Thus, the principal will observe only effort choices belonging to {el(0), eh(0)}2 and
only needs to condition on these. We call el(0) and eh(0) a low and a high ﬁrst-round effort, respectively. We will consider
only sanctioning strategies where sanctioning choices do not depend on player indices but only on effort levels. Thus we
can identify s∗ : [110, 170]2 → {0, 1} with s∗ ∈ {0, 1}3 where s∗1, s∗2 and s∗3 are the sanctioning choices conditional on the ﬁrst
round events {(el(0), el(0))}, {(el(0), eh(0)), (eh(0), el(0))} and {(eh(0), eh(0))}, respectively.
We will make predictions that satisfy the following requirements.
1 The strategies of the principal and the two players can be supported as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Out of
equilibrium actions of the principal do not change the belief of a player about her partner’s effort.
2 The PBE does not depend on the speciﬁc form of the prior of the principal.
3 The PBE can be sustained for a non-degenerate interval of values of c.
We make some comments before we turn to the analysis. Given the assumptions above, a PBE is uniquely characterized
by the sanctioning function s∗(, ) of the principal. Following requirement 2 the equilibrium candidate must be optimal,
regardless of the beliefs over p1 and p2. This implies that it will be sufﬁcient to evaluate deviations from an equilibrium
candidate using a degenerate prior of the principal, i.e. when the principal is (almost) sure about p1 and p2. If the principal
does not want to deviate under any degenerate prior, she will also not want to do so under more general priors. To see this,
it sufﬁces to note that expected payoffs of a deviation under a general prior are just a convex combination of payoffs under
some degenerate priors, and therefore cannot be strictly higher.There are 23 =8 candidates for a PBE. In two of these the principal’s choices are unconditional: s∗ = (1, 1, 1) and s∗ = (0, 0,
0). To “always sanction”, i.e. s∗ = (1, 1, 1), can be supported if and only if epm (1) − 4c≥epm (0) holds for all pm. Here we use our
requirement that beliefs pi do not changewhen the principal chooses the out of equilibriumaction to not sanction. Necessary
14 Without the consistency requirement, this is not necessarily true. As a counter-example, consider the case where high type partners have point beliefs
and hence do not respond to lower effort costs. Assume furthermore that beliefs are such that both players choose high effort in the ﬁrst round. As the effort
of the high type partner remains unchanged in round two, players’ effort remains unchanged too. Yet if some probability is put on the low type partners
and if these respond to changes in effort cost, we ﬁnd that beliefs move more than effort. However, this scenario occurs only if beliefs are inconsistent in
the sense that ﬁrst-round efforts are higher than ﬁrst-round beliefs.
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And sufﬁcient conditions are given by eh(1)−4c≥ eh(0) and el(1)−4c≥ el(0). When investigating “never sanction”, i.e. s∗ = (0,
, 0), special attention must be given to a player with p∈ (k− k1, k). A sanction would induce this player to switch from low
o high effort, this is not in the interest of the principal if eh(1)−4c≤ el(0). In fact, this is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
or supporting “never sanction”.
An intuitive conditional strategy is given by s∗ = (1, 1, 0) where the principal sanctions if and only if at least one of the two
layers chose a loweffort in the ﬁrst round. The conditions supporting this as a PBE emergewhen considering three subcases.
hen both players chose low ﬁrst-round effort then s∗ prescribes to sanction is best when epm (1) − 4c≥el(0) holds for all pm,
ence when el(1)−4c≥ el(0). When both exerted high effort in the ﬁrst round, then s∗ =0 which is best if eh(0)≥ el(1)−4c.
inally, consider the casewhere one player had a low and the other a high ﬁrst round effort. Then s∗ =1which yields outcome
l(1)−4c as the player with high ﬁrst-round effort now believes that her partner is of low type. Not sanctioning causes the
layer with low ﬁrst round effort to choose epi (0) = el(0) and the one with high ﬁrst-round effort to choose eh(0), which is
orse if el(1)−4c≥ el(0). Together this means that s∗ = (1, 1, 0) can be supported if and only if eh(0)≥ el(1)−4c≥ el(0). Note
hat in this equilibrium, sanctions are “bad news” in the sense that playing s∗ =1 will alert a high effort player to the fact that
er partner chose low effort.
The ﬁve remaining strategies can all be ruled out by our requirements 1–3. It is easy to show that s∗ = (0, 1, 0), s∗ = (0, 1,
), s∗ = (0, 0, 1) cannot be supported at PBE. Moreover, one can rule out s∗ = (1, 0, 0) and s∗ = (1, 0, 1) using requirement 3. We
ummarize as follows.
roposition 1. The following values of s∗ are the only ones that can be supported as a PBE for all Gp for a nondegenerate set of
: (i) (1, 1, 1) if ev(1) − 4c > ev(0) for v ∈ {l, h}, (ii) (1, 1, 0) if eh(0) > el(1)−4c> el(0), (iii) (0, 0, 0) if eh(1)−4c< el(0).
Proposition1 implies that there is nouniqueprediction forwhether or not theprincipalwill sanction low types orwhether
r not she will sanction high types. With respect to players 1 and 2, their efforts remain unchanged if there is no sanction.
layers with low ﬁrst round effort who are sanctioned increase effort in the same way as under an exogenous sanction,
ecause the sanctions do not change the belief about the type of player she is facing. However, the predicted change in effort
f a player with high ﬁrst-round effort is ambiguous. She will increase effort in case (i), but when sanctions are “bad news”
s in case (ii), she may reduce effort.
ppendix B: Stochastic difference and inequality
In the following we present two tests for making ordinal comparisons between two random variables, one for matched
airs and one for independent samples. Both tests are invariant to monotonic transformations. For matched pairs we show
ow one can transform the data, to then perform a test for comparing two Bernoulli random variables. For comparisons
ased on two independent samples we review a new test of Schlag (2008). Both tests are designed to uncover how two
istributions in small samples differ without adding distributional assumptions. Permutation tests such as the Wilcoxon
nd the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test can only establish signiﬁcant evidence that two distribtutions differ (for counter
xamples in independent samples see Forsythe et al., 1994).
Given two random variables Y1 and Y2, ı(Y1, Y2) = Pr(Y2 >Y1)−Pr(Y2 <Y1) is called the stochastic difference between Y1
erses Y2 (Cliff, 1993). The stochastic difference can be estimated by computing the sample analogues. Consider ﬁrst the
ase of matched pairs where data is given by joint observations of Y1 and Y2. The estimate is calculated by ignoring all pairs
n which Y1 =Y2 and then taking the difference between the empirical frequency of pairs with Y2 >Y1 and of pairs in which
2 <Y1. Now consider the case in which there are two independent samples, one associated to each variable. Here one can
stimate ı by considering the frequency of Y2 >Y1 among all possible pairs in which Y1 /= Y2 and subtracting from this the
requency in which Y2 <Y1 among all these pairs. The resulting estimates are unbiased.
If ı(Y1, Y2) > 0 then one says that Y2 tends to yield larger outcomes than Y1. We wish to identify signiﬁcant evidence that
2 tends to yield larger outcomes than Y1. So we wish to test the null hypothesis H0 : ı(Y1, Y2)≤0 against the alternative
ypothesis H1 : ı(Y1, Y2) > 0 for a given speciﬁed level ˛. Following Vargha and Delaney (1998) we call this a test of stochastic
nequality (see also Brunner and Munzel, 2000).
For matched pairs as given by n independent observations of (Y1, Y2) one can proceed as follows. Replace events Y1 >Y2
y (1, 0), Y1 =Y2 by (0, 0) and Y1 <Y2 by (0, 1) and apply the z-test for matched pairs (Suissa and Shuster, 1991).
For the case of independent pairs, the test for stochastic inequality by Schlag (2008) proceeds as follows. In a ﬁrst step
bservations from two independents are randomly matched. One treats these as matched pairs and then proceeds to test
s if these matched pairs are exogenously given. In a second step one controls for the randomness that is implicit in the
atching. For more details see Schlag (2008).
ppendix C: Full sample descriptive statistics
See Table 6.ppendix D: Testing reciprocity
See Fig. 5 and Table 7.
Table 6
Mean effort and belief levels (lower bound (L) and upper bound (U)) for the entire sample, as well as for those who played low effort (∈{110, 111, . . .,
134}) and high effort (∈{135, 136, . . ., 165}) players. For the high effort players the number of observations for beliefs may exert that of effort, since some
players chose effort > 165≥beliefs (L). Note that for the endogenous treatment the number of observations may not correspond to those in the ﬁgures and
the statistical tests, since we use group means to correct for the potential interdependence of observations.
# Obs First round Second round
Effort (Belief) Effort Belief (L) Belief (U) Effort Belief (L) Belief (U)
All ExNS 30 141.8 134.9 150.9 144.0 139.0 155.2
ExS 34 139.6 133.9 156.7 155.3 147.5 164.5
EnNS 40 150.5 145.0 160.0 150.2 144.6 160.5
EnS 58 144.8 141.3 158.1 155.9 150 164.2
Low effort ExNS 10 119.2 115.2 130.2 132.8 129.5 147.6
ExS 16 118.6 122.8 147.6 151.1 141.1 162.4
EnNS 12 122.4 124.3 143.9 128.6 124.8 147.5
EnS 21 119.2 122.4 144.4 147.3 140.8 159.9
High effort ExNS 13 (19) 143.9 143.2 160.8 140.8 142.4 158.4
ExS 9 (16) 146.7 140.6 164.2 160.4 150.9 165.8
EnNS 14 (22) 155.4 149.8 166.1 154.8 150.1 164.9
EnS 26 (32) 155.1 149.3 165.3 157.0 153.2 166.0
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Fig. 5. Second round effort minus the belief lower bound for the full sample in all treatments.
Table 7
Regression of changes in effort on changes in beliefs, a dummy for the introduction of a sanction (takes a value of 1 for the ExS and EnS treatments) and for
the EnS treatment, using the full sample. We assume homoskedastic errors. t statistics in parentheses.
Effort change
Belief change 0.839***
(10.53)
Sanction 4.759
(1.51)
Endogenous sanction −0.439
(−0.14)
Constant −0.514
(−0.30)
Observations 162
R2 0.472*p<0.10
**p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.Appendix E. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.002.
RB
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
D
F
F
F
F
F
F
G
G
G
K
M
N
S
S
S
S
S
T
V
V
Xeferences
énabou, R., Tirole, J., 2003. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Rev. Econ. Stud. 70, 489–520.
énabou, R., Tirole, J., 2011. Laws and norms. In: NBER Working Paper 17579.
owles, S., 2008. Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine the moral sentiments: evidence from economic experiments. Science 320.
randts, J., Cooper, D., 2006. A change would do you good: an experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations. Am. Econ. Rev.
96 (3), 669–693.
remzen, A., Khoklova, E., Suvorov, A., vandeVen, J., 2011. BadNews:AnExperimental Studyon the Informational Effects of Rewards. AmsterdamUniversity,
mimeo.
runner, E., Munzel, U., 2000. The nonparametric Behrens–Fisher problem: asymptotic theory and a small-sample approximation. Biometr. J. 42, 17–25.
liff, N., 1993. Dominance statistics: ordinal analyses to answer ordinal questions. Psychol. Bull. 114, 494–509.
osta-Gomes, M., Crawford, V., 2006. Cognition and behavior in two-person guessing games: an experimental study. Am. Econ. Rev. 96, 1737–1768.
evetag, G., Ortmann, A., 2007. When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory. Exp. Econ. 10, 331–344.
ehr, E., Rockenbach, B., 2003. Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism. Nature 422, 137–140.
ischbacher, U., 2007. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Exp. Econ. 10 (2), 171–178.
orsythe, R., Horowitz, J.L., Savin, N.E., Sefton, M., 1994. Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games Econ. Behav. 6, 347–369.
rey, B.S., Jegen, R., 2001. Motivation crowding theory. J. Econ. Surv. 15 (5), 589–611.
rey, B.S., Oberholzer-Gee, F., 1997. The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out. Am. Econ. Rev. 87 (3), 746–755.
riebel, G., Schnedler, W., 2011. Team governance: empowerment or hierarchical control. J. Econ. Behav. Org. 78, 1–13.
neezy, U., Rustichini, A., 2000. A ﬁne is a price. J. Legal Stud. 29, 1–17.
oeree, J., Holt, C.A., 2005. An experimental study of costly coordination. Games Econ. Behav. 51, 349–364.
oeree, J., Holt, C.A., 2001. Then little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions. Am. Econ. Rev. 91 (5), 1402–1422.
amei, K., 2010. Democracy and Resilient Pro-Social Behavioral Change: An Experimental Study. Brown University Department of Economics (available at:
www.econ.brown.edu/students/kenju kamei/JMP.pdf).
arkussen, T., Putterman, L., Tyran, J.-R., 2011. Self-organization for collective action: an experimental study of voting on formal, informal, and no sanction
regimes. In: Working Paper 2011-4. Department of Economics, Brown University.
agel, R., 1995. Unraveling in guessing games: an experimental study. Am. Econ. Rev. 85 (5), 1313–1326.
chlag, K.H., 2008. A new method for constructing exact tests without making any assumptions. In: Working Paper 1109. Department of Economics and
Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
chlag, K.H., van der Weele, J.J., 2011. Incentives for Interval Elicitation. Manuscript, University of Vienna.
liwka, D., 2007. Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes. Am. Econ. Rev. 97 (3), 999–1012.
pearman, C., 1904. The proof and measurement of association between two things. Am. J. Psychol. 15, 72–101.
uissa, S., Shuster, J.J., 1991. The 2×2 matched-pairs trial: exact unconditional design and analysis. Biometrics 47, 361–372.
yran, J.-R., Feld, L.P., 2006. Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent. Scand. J. Econ. 108 (1), 135–156.
an der Weele, J.J., 2012. The signaling power of sanctions in social dilemmas. J. Law Econ. Org. 28 (1), 103–125.
argha, A., Delaney, H.D., 1998. The Kruskal–Wallis test and stochastic homogeneity. J. Educ. Behav. Stat. 23 (2), 170–192.
iao, E., 2013. Proﬁt seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience. Games Econ. Behav. 77, 321–344.
